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To assess household transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 in San Antonio, Texas, USA, during April 15–May 8, 
2009, we investigated 77 households. The index case-pa-
tient was deﬁ  ned as the household member with the earliest 
onset date of symptoms of acute respiratory infection (ARI), 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI), or laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. Median interval between illness onset in index 
and secondary case-patients was 4 days (range 1–9 days); 
the index case-patient was likely to be <18 years of age (p 
= 0.034). The secondary attack rate was 4% for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, 9% for ILI, and 13% for ARI. The secondary 
attack rate was highest for children <5 years of age (8%–
19%) and lowest for adults >50 years of age (4%–12%). 
Early in the outbreak, household transmission primarily oc-
curred from children to other household members and was 
lower than the transmission rate for seasonal inﬂ  uenza.
O
n April 15 and 17, 2009, the ﬁ  rst 2 cases of pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 in the United States were identiﬁ  ed 
among children in California; within 10 weeks, the strain 
was identiﬁ  ed in 99 countries or territories (1). Texas was 
the second US state to conﬁ   rm human transmission of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. On April 24, 2009, the Texas De-
partment of State Health Services reported 2 patients with 
laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection in 
Guadalupe County. The strain was similar to that isolated 
previously from patients in Mexico and California (2). On 
June 11, 2009, the World Health Organization raised the 
pandemic alert to phase 6, indicating that a global pandem-
ic was under way (3).
Characterizing transmission dynamics in various set-
tings, such as households, schools, and the community, is 
critical to the development of appropriate guidance and 
public health interventions. Household contacts of persons 
with seasonal inﬂ  uenza are at increased risk for infection 
(4–7), but the household transmission characteristics of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 have yet to be fully character-
ized. This study reports household secondary attack rates 
and serial time intervals between illness onset in the in-
dex case-patient to illness onset in a household contact. We 
investigated persons with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 and their household contacts in 1 health ser-
vice region of Texas.
Methods
Population
The Texas Department of State Health Services con-
sists of 11 health service regions. We conducted our in-
vestigation in Health Service Region 8, which includes 28 
counties in south-central Texas, bordered on the south by 
Mexico (Figure). Approximately 2.4 million persons live in 
the region; 1.5 million live in the city of San Antonio (8). 
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The Texas Department of State Health Services provides 
public health services in counties without local health de-
partments. Within Health Service Region 8, public health 
services for Bexar County are provided by the San Antonio 
Metropolitan Health District and for Comal County by the 
Comal County Health Department.
Case Deﬁ  nitions
We deﬁ  ned a laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case-patient as a 
resident of Health Service Region 8 who had a positive re-
spiratory specimen showing nucleic acid sequences unique 
to pandemic (H1N1) 2009; a real-time reverse transcrip-
tion–PCR (rRT-PCR) assay was used to detect the virus 
(9). For persons with no laboratory test performed, we 
assessed whether they had inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI), de-
ﬁ  ned as fever (measured or unmeasured) with either cough 
or sore throat; or acute respiratory infection (ARI), deﬁ  ned 
as >2 of the following signs or symptoms: fever, cough, 
sore throat, and rhinorrhea. The index case-patient was de-
ﬁ  ned as the household member with the earliest symptom 
onset date of ARI, ILI, or laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009. A secondary case-patient was deﬁ  ned as a 
household member with ARI, ILI, or laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and symptom onset 1–9 days af-
ter symptom onset in the index case-patient. We chose the 
maximum interval of 9 days because shedding of seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza virus uncommonly lasts >8 days (10) and the me-
dian incubation period for seasonal inﬂ  uenza is ≈1.4 days 
(11). Household members were deﬁ  ned as persons who 
lived at the same address as a case-patient who had labora-
tory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection.
Case Finding
During April 10–May 8, 2009, we identiﬁ  ed laborato-
ry-conﬁ  rmed cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 by review-
ing 1,167 laboratory records of inﬂ  uenza specimens sub-
mitted by healthcare providers for rRT-PCR testing by the 
regional public health laboratory in San Antonio. We also 
reviewed 1,251 laboratory records of all specimens submit-
ted by military medical treatment facilities in San Antonio. 
These specimens were tested for inﬂ  uenza by rRT-PCR at 
the Epidemiology Laboratory Service of the Department 
of Defense Global Inﬂ  uenza Surveillance Program at the 
United States Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine 
in San Antonio. In addition, we conducted telephone in-
terviews with 540 (67%) of 802 high school students who 
were reported as absent by their school administrators 
during April 9–28 in the Texas counties where the ﬁ  rst 2 
identiﬁ  ed case-patients attended school. Respiratory sam-
ples were collected from students who reported an acute 
respiratory illness at the time of interview. Additional case-
patients were identiﬁ  ed by collecting respiratory samples 
from nonhousehold contacts of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case-
patients (i.e., those who had been within 6 feet of someone 
with ARI for at least 1 hour during the period 1 day before 
through 7 days after onset of illness in the contact).
Household Investigations
We interviewed case-patients with laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed infection and all household members about the oc-
currence of illness, receipt of inﬂ  uenza vaccination in the 
previous 12 months, and medical history. We asked all per-
sons about their use of antiviral medication and reviewed 
health department pharmacy records where appropriate to 
ascertain the type, dosage, and timing of antiviral medica-
tion and to deﬁ  ne whether antiviral medications were pre-
scribed for treatment or prophylaxis. Respiratory samples 
were collected from household contacts who had an acute 
respiratory illness at the time of interview; respiratory 
samples were collected from all members of 9 households 
identiﬁ  ed early in the investigation, regardless of respira-
tory symptoms.
Sample Collection and Laboratory Testing
Nasal wash samples were collected from military 
servicemen and their household family members, and na-
sopharyngeal swabs were collected from all others. Nasal 
wash samples were sent to the Epidemiology Laboratory 
Service at the United States Air Force School of Aerospace 
Medicine; nasopharyngeal swabs were sent to the regional 
public health laboratory in San Antonio. We used rRT-PCR 
to test all respiratory samples for seasonal inﬂ  uenza (A/H1 
and A/H3 inﬂ  uenza viruses). Specimens positive for inﬂ  u-
enza A but negative for seasonal inﬂ  uenza by rRT-PCR 
were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
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Figure. Texas Department of State Health Services Health Service 
Region 8 (gray shading), Texas, USA.Household Transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
tion (CDC) for conﬁ  rmatory testing for pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 (12).
Statistical Analysis
We calculated the serial interval as the number of days 
from the onset date of illness in the index case-patient to 
onset date of illness in the secondary case-patient. Second-
ary household attack rates were calculated by dividing the 
number of secondary case-patients (excluding the index 
case-patient) by the total number of household members 
(excluding the index case-patient). Secondary case-patients 
for ILI and ARI attack rates also included laboratory-con-
ﬁ  rmed case-patients. We compared characteristics between 
groups by using the χ2 test or Fisher exact test for categori-
cal data and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for continuous 
variables (13).
Ethics
The collection of information about cases of pandem-
ic (H1N1) 2009 was part of the emergency public health 
practice response and was not deemed to be research in 
accordance with the federal human subjects protection 
regulations (45 Code of Federal Regulations 46.101c and 
46.102d) and CDC’s Guidelines for Deﬁ  ning Public Health 
Research and Public Health Non-Research. All protocols 
pertaining to the pandemic were reviewed for protection 
concerns and the necessity of Institutional Review Board 
review by the CDC’s National Center for Immunization 
and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD) Human Subjects Con-
tact and the NCIRD Associate Director of Science.
Results
We identiﬁ  ed 110 persons with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection. We were unable to con-
tact 23 (21%) of these persons, and 3 (3%) did not agree to 
provide further information. Of 84 persons with laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection who provided 
information, 77 (92%) lived with >1 persons. These 77 
households comprised 349 persons; the median household 
size was 4 persons (range 2–9 persons), including the index 
case-patient. Seventy ﬁ  ve percent of household interviews 
were conducted >8 days (range 0–24 days) after the onset 
of infection in the index case-patient.
From household interviews, we identiﬁ  ed an additional 
47 persons who reported respiratory symptoms or had lab-
oratory evidence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection: 13 
persons with laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
infection, 24 persons with ILI, and 10 persons whose illness 
met the case deﬁ  nition for ARI only. We did not classify 15 
of these persons as secondary case-patients: 8 persons had 
the same date of symptom onset as the index case-patient; 
we could not establish the date of symptom onset for 3 per-
sons; and 4 persons reported illness onset 10–15 days after 
the index case-patient. In 1 household where 2 persons had 
ILI, 1 had a nasopharyngeal swab that was positive for pan-
demic (H1N1) 2009; the other was positive for inﬂ  uenza A, 
but the subtype could not be determined, possibly because 
of the quality of the sample or because 9 days had elapsed 
between illness and sample collection, thus decreasing 
viral load. We considered this person to have laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 on the basis of an epi-
demiologic link to another laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case. In 2 
households where secondary case-pateints were identiﬁ  ed, 
nasal swab samples were obtained from members of all 
7 households; 1 person, 14 years of age, who did not re-
port any respiratory symptoms, was positive for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 infection.
Among the 97 symptomatic laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case-
patients (84 identiﬁ  ed through case ﬁ  nding and 13 through 
household investigation), illness onset dates ranged from 
April 11 through May 8, 2009. Eleven (11%) were <4 years 
of age, 61 (63%) 5–18 years of age, 22 (23%) 19–49 years 
of age, and 3 (3%) >50 years of age. Forty-six (47%) were 
male. The most common signs and symptoms were fever 
(93%), cough (91%), rhinnorhea (70%), headache (67%), 
and sore throat (58%). Vomiting was reported by 26% 
and diarrhea by 25%. Ninety-two percent of laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed case-patients met the deﬁ  nition for ARI, and 
85% met the deﬁ  nition for ILI. One laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
case-patient was hospitalized: a child who was admitted 
to the hospital with pneumonia in early April. No deaths 
occurred. Compared with household contacts who did not 
have laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or did 
not report respiratory illness, laboratory-conﬁ  rmed case-
patients (index and secondary) were signiﬁ  cantly younger 
(median age 17 vs. 24 years; p<0.001).
Secondary case-patients were found in 24 (31%) of 
77 households; 5 had 2 secondary case-patients, and 1 had 
3 case-patients (Table 1). Secondary infections appeared 
most likely to be transmitted between children (12/32, 
38%) or children to adults (10/32, 31%) than from adults 
to children (6/32, 19%) or adults to adults (4/32, 13%) (p 
= 0.034). The median serial interval for ARI, ILI, and lab-
oratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 combined was 
4 days (range 1–9 days) (Table 1; online Appendix Figure, 
www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/4/631-appF.htm). Antiviral 
treatment was given to the index case-patient of 23 (72%) 
of 32 secondary case-patients; in these households, the se-
rial interval was 3 days, compared with 5 days when the 
index case-patient was not given treatment (p = 0.17). In-
clusion of 5 household contacts with illness that occurred 
10–15 days after symptom onset of the index case-patient 
did not alter the median serial interval estimate. The me-
dian serial interval also remained unchanged when only 
members of households interviewed >9 days after the on-
set of symptoms in the household index case-patient were 
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included. Limiting the estimate of median serial interval 
to include only persons with ILI or laboratory-conﬁ  rmed 
case-patients reduced the median serial interval to 3 days 
(range 1–8 days).
The secondary household attack rate was 13% for ARI, 
9% for ILI, and 4% for laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 (Table 2). Secondary attack rates were high-
est in children <5 years of age and were higher in children 
5–18 years of age than in adults 19–49 and >50 years of 
age (Table 2). By household size, secondary attack rates 
for ARI, ILI, and laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 
2009  were highest in households with 2–3 persons (ARI 
23%, ILI 23%, laboratory-conﬁ   rmed pandemic [H1N1] 
2009 6%) and were lowest in households with 7–9 persons 
(ARI 9%, ILI 9%, laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic [H1N1] 
2009 2%) (online Appendix Table 1, www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/16/4/631-appT1.htm). The secondary household 
attack rate did not differ by receipt of seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
vaccination in the previous 12 months (online Appendix 
Table 2, www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/4/631-appT2.htm).
Treatment with antiviral medication was given to 77% 
of index case-patients (57/74 of persons with ARI, ILI, and 
laboratory-conﬁ   rmed pandemic [H1N1] 2009 combined 
for whom data were available) and 72% of secondary cases 
(23/32 of ARI, ILI, and laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
[H1N1] 2009 combined); 90% took oseltamivir; 7% took 
zanamivir; and 3% took an unknown type of antiviral medi-
cation. Neither the age of the index case-patient, household 
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Table 1. Index and secondary household case-patients with ARI, ILI, or laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Region 8, 
Texas, April–May, 2009* 
Household
Index case-patients Secondary case-patients Serial
interval, d† Date of onset Age, y Case definition Date of onset Age, y Case definition
A Apr 18 14‡ A, no subtype Apr 25 21 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 7
B Apr 19 5 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 21 9 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 2
C Apr 22 18 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 25 <1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 3
D Apr 26 1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 4 27 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 2
E Apr 26 16 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 27 51 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 1
Apr 27 8 ILI 1
F Apr 27 <1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 29 22 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 2
May 6 47 ARI 9
G Apr 27 16 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 1 16 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 4
May 1 14 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 4
H Apr 29 6 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 3 <1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 1
I May 3 33 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 7 15 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 4
May 8 14 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 5
Subtotal no. case-patients  9 13 3 (1–9)
J Apr 20 17 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 26 14 ARI 6
K Apr 24 71 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 27 65 ILI 3
L Apr 25 16 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 27 16 ILI 2
M Apr 25 12 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Apr 28 30 ARI 3
Apr 28 33 ARI 3
Apr 30 6 ARI 5
N Apr 26 30 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 1 28 ARI 5
O Apr 27 33 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 5 53 ARI 8
P Apr 28 25 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 4 14 ILI 6
Q Apr 29 1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 1 21 ILI 2
May 2 2 ILI 3
R Apr 29 8 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 3 44 ARI 4
S May 1 6 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 May 3 45 ILI 2
Subtotal no. case-patients  10 13 3 (1–8) 
T Apr 17  11 ILI Apr 21  18 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  4
U Apr 18  48 ILI Apr 26  10 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  8
V Apr 23  53 ILI Apr 26  42 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  3
W Apr 24  5 ILI Apr 29  <1 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  5
X Apr 28  26 ILI May 2  7 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009  4
May 3  4 ILI 5
Subtotal no. case-patients  5 6 4.5 (3–8) 
Total no. case-patients  24 32 4 (1–9) 
*ARI, acute respiratory infection; ILI, influenza-like illness (fever measured or subjective and cough or sore throat).  
†Median (range) number of days between symptom onset of the index and secondary case-patients. 
‡The influenza virus from this person could not be subtyped, possibly because of the quality of the sample or the length of time from symptom onset to 
sample collection. We considered this case-patient to have been infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009.  Household Transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
size, nor diagnosis of the index patient (with ARI, ILI, or 
laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic [H1N1] 2009) were pre-
dictive of treatment with antiviral medication. The second-
ary household attack rates for ARI, ILI, and laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 combined in households 
where the index case-patient was given antiviral treatment 
was 12% compared with 16% in other households (p = 
0.64) (Table 3). Antiviral prophylaxis was given to 39% 
of household contacts (92/235 with data available) (Table 
3), and the secondary attack rate of ARI, ILI, and laborato-
ry-conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 combined was 14% 
(12/83) in households where the index patient took treat-
ment, compared with 66% (6/9) (p = 0.003) in households 
where the index patient did not take treatment (Table 3).
Discussion
During an outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in the 
San Antonio, Texas, area, we identiﬁ  ed 97 persons with 
laboratory-conﬁ  rmed infection in 77 households. The epi-
demiologic and clinical features were similar to summary 
reports from the United States (14,15) and other countries 
(15,16). Nearly one third of households had secondary 
case-patients who also had respiratory illness, with a me-
dian of 4 days between onset of illness in the index case-
patient and household members, a ﬁ  nding similar to that for 
seasonal inﬂ  uenza (17).
The secondary attack rate was 4% for laboratory-
conﬁ  rmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 9% for ILI, and 13% 
for ARI. In general, these rates are lower than for seasonal 
inﬂ  uenza and lower than anticipated for a pandemic strain, 
although rates vary from 13% to 30%, depending on inﬂ  u-
enza subtype and year and pandemic period (4,5,18–21). 
The highest proportion of laboratory-conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 and secondary attack rates occurred in chil-
dren, a ﬁ  nding consistent with the epidemiology of season-
al and pandemic inﬂ  uenza, where we know children expe-
rience higher rates of illness (4,5,7) and higher secondary 
attack rates (19). Adults may have some cross-protection 
against pandemic (H1N1) 2009 from antibodies developed 
during infections with seasonal inﬂ  uenza A virus (H1N1) 
(22–24).
Four randomized controlled trials of zanamivir and os-
eltamivir for seasonal inﬂ  uenza have shown that these anti-
viral medications reduce but do not eliminate viral shedding 
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Table 2. Household secondary attack rates for ARI, ILI, and laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, by age group, Region 8, 
Texas, April–May 2009* 
Illness type by  
age group, y
No. index  
case-patients
Household contacts Household
members not 
included
Secondary attack 
rate (A/A + B), %
Secondary  
case-patients, A Not ill, B
Total household 
contacts, A + B
ARI
 <5 7 5 23 28 1 18
 5–18 50 13 83 96 3 14
 19–49 17 11 96 107 3 10
 > 50 3 3 22 25 1 12
 All  ages 77 32 224 256 8 13
ILI
 <5 6 5 23 28 2 18
 5–18 50 11 86 97 2 11
 19–49 18 6 102 108 1 6
 > 50 3 2 23 25 1 8
 All  ages 77 24 234 258 6 9
Laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
 <5 8 2 26 28 0 7
 5–18 51 5 92 97 1 5
 19–49 16 3 108 111 0 3
 > 50 2 1 26 27 0 4
 All  ages 77 11 252 263 1 4
*ARI, acute respiratory infection; ILI, influenza-like illness (fever measured or subjective and cough or sore throat). Ill household members were not 
included in the calculation of the secondary attack rate if they had the same symptom onset as the index case or if symptom onset was not known. 
Table 3. Household secondary attack rates for ARI, ILI, and laboratory-confirmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009, by antiviral medication 
treatment and prophylaxis, Region 8, Texas, April–May 2009* 
Type of contact  No. contacts
Index case-patient received antiviral treatment (attack rate, %)
Yes No p value†
All contacts of index case-patients 235 22/185 (12) 8/50 (16) 0.64
Contacts who took antiviral prophylaxis 92 12/83 (14) 6/9 (67) 0.003
*ARI, acute respiratory infection; ILI, influenza-like illness (fever measured or subjective and cough or sore throat). 
†Fisher exact test comparing the secondary attack rate for any treatment to no antiviral treatment. Data about antiviral medication were missing for 2 
index case-patients and 15 contacts. RESEARCH
and are effective in preventing disease among household 
contacts, especially if taken within 48 hours of illness on-
set in the index case-patient (19,20,25,26). We found that 
secondary attack rates for all households were lower when 
the index case-patient received treatment, although this dif-
ference was not signiﬁ  cant. The role of prophylaxis in the 
absence of treatment of the index case-patient was difﬁ  -
cult to determine; our investigation included only a small 
number of such persons. Nevertheless, because most index 
and secondary case-patients received antiviral treatment, 
household secondary attack rates may have been reduced.
Our investigation has several limitations. Because 
early case ﬁ  nding was most intensive among high school 
children associated with school outbreaks, our cohort may 
have been biased in favor of households where the index 
case-patients were children; however, this would not ex-
plain a lower secondary attack rate among adult household 
contacts. We did not assess the role of mild or asymptom-
atic pandemic (H1N1) 2009 infection because we collected 
respiratory samples only; serologic assays to detect inﬂ  u-
enza antibodies are the most sensitive method for detect-
ing asymptomatic infection, but virus assays for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 were not available at the time of the inves-
tigation. Volunteer challenge studies with seasonal inﬂ  u-
enza viruses have found that up to 30% of infected persons 
may be asymptomatic and could be identiﬁ  ed through se-
rologic testing (10). Because 25% of household interviews 
were conducted <8 days after onset of illness of the index 
case-patient, we may have underestimated the secondary 
attack rate if these households had secondary case-patients 
with long serial intervals. However, when we restricted 
our analysis to persons interviewed >8 days after onset of 
symptoms in the index case-patient, we found no differ-
ence in the median serial interval or distribution of attack 
rates by age. Conversely, household members interviewed 
>8 days after onset of illness in the index case-patient may 
have had incomplete recall of acute respiratory infections. 
Finally, some of the secondary illnesses may have been ac-
quired in the community, leading to overestimate of house-
hold secondary attack rates.
We found that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 disproportion-
ately affected children, who in turn posed a risk for second-
ary household transmission, especially to their caregivers 
and siblings. The Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (2009) recommends that children 6–18 years of 
age and caregivers of infants be included as initial target 
groups for the new pandemic (H1N1) 2009 vaccine (27), 
which may reduce household transmission. As pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 continues to spread internationally, ongoing 
investigations are needed to shed further light on transmis-
sion dynamics, to monitor epidemiologic changes over 
time, and to assess the effectiveness of public health inter-
ventions.
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